Enough has already been said about ‘terrorism’ and about the extremely feeble ‘security landscape’ of our country. We have heard subject-matter experts talk fervently about terrorism and its impact and how it is a potent threat NOT only to India but the world at large. We have read, re-read, dissected, analyzed, and reviewed each one of the media reports published, passionately highlighting the series of bombings and other terrorist activities on the Indian mainland. We the people of India have also heard the decision makers of our country beat the age old rhetoric of a vigorous response and taking sound anti-terror measures, both on diplomatic and national security front. On the first anniversary of 26/11, let us attempt to logically review the year gone by. The focus, for this piece of writing, is on 26/11, homeland security and cross-border terrorism.

It’s an open secret that the Indian sub-continent is witnessing what is unarguably one of its most traumatic phases. Terrorism is not new to India and this fact is largely attributable to the regional instabilities that exist. Pakistan – our traditional adversary more than a neighbor and Afganistan have regularly exported trained terrorists into our country. North-East remains a disturbed region with its share of separatist elements. And now, Naxals are practically knocking on the doors of most of our mega cities (as of now, Naxals are active across approximately 220 districts out of a total of 626 in India).

While terrorism has prevailed for the better part of our country’s independent existence, like the Parliament attack of Dec 2001, the Mumbai terror attacks marked a turning point in terrorism in India. The highly coordinated attacks on Mumbai would be better classified as a ‘military raid’ than a ‘terrorist strike’ owing to the similarity it bore to the commando tactics specific to the aforementioned special operation viz., detailed planning and selection of multiple targets, achievement of operational surprise, small team concept, clock-work precision, effective and coordinated use of weapons and ammunition etc. The attacks involved five small teams of terrorists who struck at a total of ten different locations. A first-of-its-kind attack comprising a complex mix of tactics – including random shootings at public places at peak hours, and bomb blasts followed by the three-day long hostage situation at two of the city's iconic hotels and a Jewish residential centre by heavily armed terrorists – was a indicator of the heightened operational efficiency and the easy access to targets of terror outfits.

The Mumbai carnage left approximately 174 dead and over 300 injured. The highly visible live-media coverage of the three day long Mumbai attacks resulted in a massive impact on the public opinion and the psyche of the masses in India. Consequent to the Mumbai terror attacks, other than responding to the public mood, India should have seen a radical shift in the anti-terrorism strategy and priorities of the government; a scenario very much akin to that experienced by USA and other western countries following the 9/11 attacks. While there haven’t been any major incidents in the last one year as far as terrorist strikes are concerned, our country is still as vulnerable. Indian government’s stance for dealing with such issues has largely been reactive than proactive. Last year, the Indian government announced a mixed bag of strategic initiatives to beef up its security machinery including creation of National Investigation Agency (NIA), national identity management system, new counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism schools, expansion of NSG, and creation of a coastal command. Mixed bag – firstly, because the focus is not clearly on prevention and pre-emption and secondly, the success of these initiatives will depend directly on our ability to implement them at a national scale. Even with expansion of NSG and capacity building of state level police forces (with specialized CT units), they would still be post-event reactionary forces. There is a great deal of improvement in intelligence gathering and collation but little is known about the improvement in intelligence assessment and sharing capabilities (apparently, these were the major lacunae that resulted in the unfortunate event).

Though it can be easily agreed upon that our preparedness levels have gone up since 26/11/2008 and that there is coordination at the senior most level of decision making apparatus in the country for the first time, it is too early to congratulate ourselves for the last 12 months as we need to understand the developments in Pakistan. No major terrorist strike in India (outside the state of J&K) is simply a result of the fact that the terrorists/jihadis are fighting for their own survival. Some credit also goes to the government for staying on course of sustaining the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan (something which was not seen earlier).

We may be better prepared in terms of our response to a terrorist strike or incident management, but India still needs to go a long way before it can even begin to think that it is in a position to replicate USA’s success record of terror free eight years following 9/11 – thanks to the 9/11 commission report and subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We are still some distance away from developing capabilities to prevent and pre-empt terrorist attacks. Once the situation stabilizes in our neighborhood, we will probably get back to being prime target for the terrorists as their infrastructure is yet to be dismantled, which can be activated and primed at an opportune moment. India cannot afford to be complacent at this point in time and must continue to implement effective strategic initiatives for internal security.

Anurag is a retired Special Forces officer of the Indian Army, who has served extensively in the terrorism infested states of North and North-East India.